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After the War Boom: Reconversion on the U.S. Pacific Coast, 1943-491 
 
 
One of the most dramatic changes in twentieth-century American history was the 
emergence of its Pacific Coast region as a core area of economic activity and innovation.  
Between 1900 and 1980, the share of the Far Western states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) in national population more than quadrupled, rising 
from about 3.2 percent to almost 15.5 percent.  Its share of personal income more than 
tripled, increasing from 5.3 percent to about 17.4 percent.  By 1980, the leading urban 
areas of the Pacific Coast of the United States– Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay 
Area, and Seattle--gained worldwide recognition as centers of high technology. 
Much of the traditional historiography treats the region’s experience during the 
Second World War as the watershed event in its twentieth-century growth.  For example, 
Gerald Nash’s influential work argued that World War Two represented a fundamental 
discontinuity in the West’s development and that wartime supply contracts and facility 
investments were the driving forces in the Pacific state’s rapid transformation from an 
stagnating economic “colony” of the industrial Northeast into a dynamic pace-setting 
region.2   
  There has been little or no argument that the West experienced disproportionately 
rapid expansion during the early 1940s.  Indeed contemporary observers referred to the 
wartime boom as the region’s “Second Gold Rush.”  Civilians migrated west in 
unprecedented numbers to fill jobs in the region's burgeoning aircraft and shipbuilding 
industries.  In addition, military facilities in the region were home-base for thousands of 
soldiers and sailors engaged in the Pacific campaign.  Between 1940 and 1945, the 
region’s total population increased by 2.7 million persons, or by over one-quarter.  Nor is 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank participants in the Triangle Economic History Workshop, the Development of the 
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there much disagreement that the “engine of growth” was military spending.  Between 
June 1940 and June 1945, the Far Western states received about $27 billion in federal 
government spending for war supply contracts and facility investments.  This accounted 
for close to one-eighth of the national total, roughly twice the region’s pre-war share in 
population or manufacturing employment. 
  Yet there has emerged a vigorous debate about whether the Second World War 
represented as a fundamental discontinuity as the Nash thesis suggests.3 Recent studies 
have pointed to evidence of stability in the region’s political and economic structure and 
to the roots of the region’s wartime growth in its pre-war economic development.  This 
paper attempts to advance and, in important ways, move beyond the continuity vs. 
discontinuity debate by examining the Pacific Coast’s economic experience in the 
immediate post-war period (1945-49).  I argue here that the conversion process, which 
has been unduly neglected in the recent debate, was crucial for region’s consolidation of 
the transitory gains during the war into permanently higher levels of economic activity. 
  After military spending peaked in 1943, fears spread throughout the West that the 
region’s postwar economy would not provide sufficient jobs for its greatly enlarged labor 
force.  Serious economic disruptions were widely foreseen.  In California, responsible 
authorities estimated that one million workers—about one-quarter of the labor force—-
would be unemployed one year after demobilization.  In response to these challenges, 
public agencies such as the California State Reconstruction and Reemployment 
Commission sought to plan for orderly conversion to a peacetime economy.  In addition, 
business groups and local officials lobbied the federal government and eastern firms to 
keep the West's new steel complex and other “war winnings” in operation. 
  The transition did not prove as difficult as most observers had anticipated.  The 
region’s unemployment rate in the immediate post-war period generally remained in 
single digits and the expected out-migration did not occur.  Instead, the enlarged western 
market induced a rapid inflow of new branches of national manufacturing firms, a 
vigorous expansion of existing operations, and a dramatic surge in the formation of 
                                                           
3 Roger Lotchin, Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York: Oxford, 1992); and 
the articles in “Special Issue: Fortress California at War,” Pacific Historical Review 63 (Aug. 1994).  For 
my initial take on this debate, see Paul W. Rhode, “The Nash Thesis Revisited: An Economic Historian's 
View,” pp. 363-92, in this collection. 4 
small-scale, local startups.  Many war workers and plants shifted quickly to supply 
civilian markets.  The demands for housing, schools, and services, left unfilled during the 
war, fostered vigorous job growth in construction, trade, and other services.  By 1950, the 
Pacific Coast's employment structure had largely returned to its pre-war composition, 
although on a significantly larger scale. 
  Drawing inspiration from the New Economic Geography literature, as well as 
from the traditional historiography of the West, the paper argues that strong “home 
market effects” account for the relatively easy conversion experience on the Pacific 
Coast.  Based on an empirical investigation of the long-run relationship between 
manufacturing production and the size of the region’s market, this study finds surprising 
support for the highly speculative claims that the region’s economic structure could 
support multiple equilibria and that the transitory shock of military spending during 
World War II helped push the Pacific Coast economy from a “low-level” equilibrium to a 
“higher-level” equilibrium consistent with the same fundamentals. 
This paper has the following form: the next section briefly examines the nature 
and effects of the war boom on the West Coast economy.  Section 3 discusses local 
conversion planning efforts, with a focus on wartime expectations about the post-war size 
of the Pacific Coast population, migration flows, employment levels, and unemployment 
rates.  The following section details how the actual post-war experience unfolded and 
explores how the expansion of the home market made the transition easier than 
anticipated.  Section 5 uses a new data set on California manufacturing to put the WWII 
episode into historical context by examining the long-run relationship between the 
growth of the region’s industrial output and the size of the local market.  The final section 
concludes. 
 5 
The War Boom 
 
There is no question that World War Two created an intense economic boom on 
the US Pacific Coast.  As Table 1 shows, the federal government spent about $23.5 
billion in major war supply contracts and $3.5 billion for military and industrial facilities 
in the region between June 1940 and June 1945.  California led the way, receiving $19.7 
billion or nearly three-quarters of the region’s total expenditures.4  The West Coast's 
share of national military spending, 11.8 percent, well exceeded its 1940 share of the 
nation's resident population, 6.5 percent, and its 1939 share of the nation's manufacturing 
wage-earners, 5.3 percent.  But it is important to note that most of the wartime contracts 
were for aircraft (roughly $12 billion) and ships (about $9 billion), activities in which the 
region demonstrated significant comparative advantages before the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.5     
  The wartime boom led to a 61 percent increase in non-agricultural civilian 
employment on the Pacific Coast between 1940 and 1944.  Table 2 offers a picture of the 
employment trends in the region as a whole and in its largest state, California.  The 
expansion of the manufacturing sector drove job growth in the region.  The construction 
and government sectors tended to keep pace with the overall expansion; most other 
sectors grew in absolute but not relative terms. During the war, the region’s 
manufacturing sector added about one million workers as employment increased from 
623 thousand workers in the 1939-40 period to 1,615 thousand in the 1943-44 period.  
This two-and-one-half fold increase in manufacturing employment accounted for over 60 
percent of the overall expansion of non-agricultural employment.6  
Driving this enormous growth in western manufacturing was the military’s high 
demands for the products of the region’s aircraft and shipbuilding industries.  During the 
                                                           
4 US Bureau of Census, County Data Book: 1947 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1947): 7, 77; “Industry's 
Leaders Outline West's Industrial Prospects,” Pacific Factory (Jan. 1946): 48. California State Chamber of 
Commerce, Postwar Industrial Growth in California, 1945-1948, 1948-49 Series Report No. 41. 
5 For this argument, see Paul W. Rhode, “The Impact of World War Two Spending on the California 
Economy” in R. Lotchin (ed.), The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000): 93-119. 
6 Major sectors of the economy such as agriculture, construction, trade, and services grew little in absolute 
terms during the conflict; the labor force in finance, insurance, and real estate and in mining actually 
declined. 6 
war, Pacific Coast aircraft plants produced 38 percent of the nation’s planes; its shipyards 
built 44 percent of the government’s merchant ships.7  To meet the military’s demands, 
employment in West Coast shipyards soared from less than 7 thousand in 1939 to over 
515 thousand at the peak in the summer of 1943.8  The number of workers in the region’s 
aircraft plants climbed from about 25 thousand in 1939 to about 315 thousand in the 
summer of 1943.  Together these sectors accounted for about one-half of the total 
expansion of non-agricultural employment in the Pacific region between 1940 and 1943.  
Associated with the enormous growth of these high-wage “war industries” were increases 
in the region’s wages relative to the country as a whole.  For example, the hourly wage in 
California manufacturing rose from 114.9 percent of the national average in the 1939-41 
period to 120.7 percent in the 1943-45 period.9 
The expansion of employment opportunities resulted in dramatic reductions in 
unemployment, substantial increases in labor force participation, especially of women, 
and significant inflows of population.  The region’s jobless rate, which languished at 
double-digit levels on the eve of the war, fell to a less than one percent by 1944.   
Unfortunately we lack comprehensive monthly data of the level and rate of 
unemployment in the Pacific Northwest during the war years, but the high-quality series 
available for California (displayed in Figure 1) can serve as a useful proxy for 
movements in the region as a whole.10  As the Figure shows, the state’s unemployment 
rate fell from 15.2 percent in January 1940 to 8.1 percent in December 1941, and to the 
                                                           
7 Civilian Aeronautical Administration, “Aircraft, Engine, and Propeller Production, US Military 
Acceptances, 1940-45”; Gerald J. Fisher, A Statistical Summary of Shipbuilding under the US Maritime 
Commission During World War II, Historical Reports of the War Administration, US Maritime 
Commission, No. 2, 1949. 
8 Officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco noted: “More than any other industry, 
shipbuilding has been responsible for the vast increase in population and employment on the Pacific Coast 
since 1940, and its demand for materials and supplies has been the principal factor responsible for the rapid 
expansion and development of the heavy metals and metal working industries in the (12
th) District.”   
Monthly Review, (May 1944): 21. 
9 California Division of Labor Statistics and Research, Handbook of California Labor Statistics, 1951-
1952, (San Francisco, April 1953): 81. 
10 Annual data on the unemployment rate in Washington State indicate that the unemployment rate fell 
from 14.7 percent in 1940 to 2.5 percent during the 1943/44 period.  In the latter period, fewer than 20 
thousand were unemployed. Pacific Northwest Business (Sept. 1955): 28-31.  Evidence for Oregon reveal 
that the unemployment rate fell from 14.0 percent in March 1940 to 1.5 percent in June 1943. At the latter 
date, there were only 9 thousand unemployed out of a labor force of 602.5 thousand. Oregon State, 7 
incredibly low rate of 0.3 percent in October 1943. This meant that out of a labor force of 
3908 thousand workers, only 12 thousand were without jobs.  The region’s labor market 
became so tight that the war authorities declared Los Angeles, Portland-Vancouver, San 
Diego, San Francisco-Oakland, and Seattle-Tacoma “congested production areas” and 
placed restrictions on new procurement activity.11 
Well before the market became this tight, western employers sought out new 
sources of labor.   Migrants from the Dust Bowl, who has been unwelcome in the 1930s, 
were now actively recruited.12  Housewives, students, retirees, and others discouraged 
from work by a decade of depression, were drawn into the labor force.  These forces 
more than offset the region's losses due to military enlistment and conscription.   
According to estimates from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the total labor force on 
the Pacific Coast (including the armed forces) rose from about 4,268 thousand in April 
1940 to 5,859 thousand in April 1945, an increase of 37.3 percent.  This compares with a 
national gain of 20.5 percent.  Of the 1,591 thousand added workers, natural increase 
accounted for only 92 thousand workers or about 6 percent; the participation of “extra 
workers” added 652 thousand, about 41 percent of the total.  Interstate migration made up 
53 percent of the increase, some 847 thousand workers.  Of this number, an increase of 
410 thousand would have been expected if interstate migration over the 1940-45 period 
maintained its 1935-40 volume.  The Bureau concluded that “abnormal” migration 
accounted for 437 thousand added workers (or about 27 percent of the labor force 
growth).  Most of the wartime interstate migrants came from the West North Central (32 
percent), West South Central (20 percent), and Mountain (20 percent) regions, where the 
expansion of economic opportunities did not keep pace with the Pacific region.13   
As a result of this surge in migration, World War Two was a period of vigorous 
population growth on the Pacific Coast.  Between July 1940 and July 1945, the region’s 
civilian population expanded from 9,678 thousand to nearly 11,300 thousand residents.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Eleventh Annual Report of the Unemployment Compensation Commission for the Year 1948, (Salem OR): 
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11Winifred S. Wilcox, “West Coast Manpower Program,” Manpower Review, 10:11 (Nov. 1943): 3-5, 24. 
12 California Division of Labor Statistics and Research, Labor in California, 1945-1946 (San Francisco, 
June 1947). 
13 Lester M. Pearlman, “Prospective Labor Supply on the West Coast,” Monthly Labor Review (April 
1947), pp. 565-66.  8 
The total increase in the civilian population actually understates the migration flow 
because these figure ignore the withdrawn of the region’s residents into military service.  
Net in-migration to the region totaled almost two million people (1984 thousand) over the 
1940-45 period.  At the peak, more than six hundred thousand people moved to the 
Pacific Coast each year.14 
When the war ended, the region’s population and labor force were significantly 
larger than before.  In addition, millions of footloose servicemen and women awaited 
demobilization.  But the region’s industrial structure, expanded in such a rapid and 
unbalanced matter during the war, faced serious problems of reconversion.  The leading 





Western business, labor, and political leaders became highly concerned about the 
region’s post-war prospects.  In part, this reflected the nationwide apprehension that the 
depressed conditions of the 1930s would return. But the local leaders had additional 
reasons to worry.  The war boom had attracted so many new workers, workers without 
strong roots in the region, workers with a history of moving on.  If jobs were unavailable 
in the post-war period, these migrants might either return home or, if they remained, 
become public charges.   
In addition, the war boom had been so highly unbalanced with most of the 
expansion occurring in a few sectors—aircraft and shipbuilding—that were bound to 
contract sharply once the War was over.  As local observers often noted, “reconversion” 
was a misnomer on the West Coast.  Many of the Pacific Coast factories had not 
converted from peacetime production to contribute to the war effort but had been 
constructed as the conflict raged.  When the war has over, these plants would either begin 
to compete in the civilian market for the first time or shut down.  Adding to these 
concerns was the possibility that victory in Europe might precede victory in Japan by 
                                                           
14 US Department of Commerce. Office of Domestic Commerce. State and Regional Market Indicators, 
1939-45. Economics Series. No. 60 (Washington, DC: GPO 1947) pp. 11-12. 9 
many months or even years and that the West Coast would remain on a war footing long 
after “normalcy” prevailed in the rest of the nation.  Manufacturers in the East and 
Midwest would then be able to capture the post-war civilian markets before the western 
plants had a chance to convert.   
The region began to prepare for peace well before the war was won.  In 1943, the 
California legislature established the State Reconstruction and Re-employment 
Commission to: 
develop the natural, social, and economic resources of the State, promote development of 
new industries, create new markets; promote the reemployment  of discharged 
servicemen and readjustment to displaced war workers, and the conversion of industry 
and commerce from war to peace standards; to provide for post-war adjustment and 
reconstruction, and to encourage economic and social improvement of the general 
public.15 
 
In the Pacific Northwest, the strong regional planning staffs, set up during the New Deal, 
were themselves converted to plan for post-war development.16  The staff of the 12th 
District Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco also lent a hand to the conversion effort. 
Up and down the coast, business, academic, and government organizations began 
to sample, survey, plan, and predict.  Among the key issues was how large the region’s 
post-war population and labor force be.  To answer this and other questions, the planners 
wanted to know how many of the recent entrants into the labor market would remain and 
how many veterans would return.  As an example, in early 1944 the Kaiser interests 
conducted a massive survey in the Portland area, drawing responses from over 80 
thousand war workers.  They found that about 52 percent of the respondents who had 
migrated with the previous three years intended to remain in the area after the war.  Of 
these, about 41 percent were definite in their intention to stay and another 59 percent 
intended to stay if they found work.  Based on this study, Emory Worth of the Oregon 
State Manpower Commission estimated that roughly 40 thousand in-migrant workers, 
representing about one-eighth of the 1944 labor force, would remain in the Portland-
                                                           
15 US Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises, 78
th Cong., 2
nd Sess., Part 42 Developing the West Through Small Business: III, Field Hearings  
Portland Oreg., July 28, 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944): 5335. 
16 Puget Sound Regional Planning Commission, Puget Sound Region War and Postwar Development 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1943). 10 
Vancouver area after the war.17  Glossing the numerous surveys conducted in 
Washington State, Nathaniel Engle found that “about half” of incoming war workers 
“definitely want to remain in the State” and that between 44 and 48 percent of working 
women expected to drop out of the labor force after the war.18  Adding the state’s 115 
thousand returning veterans, he estimated that Washington’s post-war labor force would 
be larger by 339 thousand workers, or by 36 percent, than in 1939.   
California authorities were both confident and concerned that the Golden State 
would keep a larger share of its recent migrants.  The State Reconstruction and 
Reemployment Commission declared in early 1944 that “(i)n no event is the State 
expected to lose even temporarily more than one-quarter to one-fifth of its wartime 
migrants, while a net population loss by 1950 is considered highly unlikely.”19  They 
estimated that in “194X” – the first year after demobilization—California’s population 
would be between 8,330 and 8,750 thousand and that in 1950 the state would likely have 
a population of 8,500 to 9,000 thousand.20  O. Wheeler, director of research at the 12
th 
District of the Federal Reserve Bank, summarized the prospects of the West as follows:  
“well over half of the in-migrants intend to remain in the region, at least if they can find 
jobs…A third or more of the former housewives apparently wish to continue working.”21 
In early 1945, authorities on the coast received more worrying news—not only 
did their own veterans plan to return, but unexpectedly large numbers of veterans from 
other states hoped to join them.  The news came from a US Army study of the post-war 
migration plans of enlisted men conducted in the summer of 1944.  Most enlisted men 
                                                           
17 US Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises, 78
th Cong., 2
nd Sess., Part 42 Developing the West Through Small Business: III, Field Hearings  
Portland Oreg., July 28, 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944): 5305-07. 
18 Nathaniel Engle was the Director of the Bureau of Business Research at the University of Washington, 
US Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises, 78
th Cong., 2
nd Sess., Part 41 Developing the West Through Small Business: II, Field Hearings  
Seattle, Wash., July 26 and 27, 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944): 5005-11. 
19 California State Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission, How Many Californians? 
(Sacramento, CA: July 1944): 17-19; Estimates of Population Growth in California, 1940-1950 
(Sacramento, CA: June 1944): 31. 
20 California State Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission, How Much Post-War Income? (Sept 
1944): 29-30; How Many Californians? (July 1944): 17-19. 
21 US Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises, 78
th Cong., 2
nd Sess., Part 41 Developing the West Through Small Business: III, Field Hearings  
Portland, Ore., July 28, 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1944): 5342-43. 11 
nation-wide (82.7 percent) stated they intended to return to the region from which they 
came; four-fifths said they would return to the same state.  In the national sample, 10.8 
percent were undecided about where to locate and 6.5 percent planned to return to a 
different division from their prewar residence.  Of this 6.5 percent, over one-quarter 
stated they intended to move to the West Coast.  This was a greater share of movers than 
any other region attracted.  Reinforcing this westward flow was the fact that enlisted men 
from the Pacific region were more likely than those from any other region to be 
“homeward-bound.”  Nearly nine-out-of-ten intended to return to the West Coast and 
only 3.6 percent planned to move away.  According to the authors of the study, the net 
effect of the movement of servicemen would be “a rapid expansion in the Pacific coast 
states.”22 
This news gave greater impetus to local efforts to gauge the extent of employment 
and unemployment during the conversion period.  The conventional wisdom was that 
employment in the “war industries” would fall to less than one-tenth of its wartime peak.  
For example, a 1944 study of Pacific Coast shipyards by the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco indicated that the region’s shipbuilders expected to have 40 thousand 
employees in an “ordinary year with good business” and only 16 thousand in an 
“ordinary year with bad business.”23  In 1943, the sector employed 515 thousand 
workers, implying that roughly one-half million workers would be laid off in the 
conversion process.24  
In combination with the Committee for Economic Development, the Bank 
conducted a more comprehensive survey of Pacific Coast manufacturing firms regarding 
                                                           
22 Abram J. Jaffe and Seymour L. Wolfbein, “Postwar Migration Plans of Army Enlisted Men,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 238 (March 1945): 18-26. The veterans were 
presumably more footloose than most other members of the US population.  They were generally in the age 
categories associated with higher levels of geographic mobility, had already been detached from their 
family’s traditional home, and had acquired federally subsidized access to housing markets and educational 
institutions nationwide through the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Bill (the GI Bill). 
23 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Monthly Review (Dec. 1944): 64.  The estimates for post-war 
employment even under bad conditions were above the 1939 level of 6.5 thousand workers in the West 
Coast yards. 
24 Actually, many workers, understanding the industry’s limited post-war prospects, “left early” to seek 
other employment opportunities.  These departures and difficulties in attracting workers to the industry’s 
dead-end jobs added to the shipbuilders’ problems of completing work during the war. 12 
their “postwar intentions” in the spring and summer of 1944.25  They asked how much 
employment the firms were currently providing and how much they would offer in the 
postwar period under “good economic conditions” and under “bad conditions.”  These 
findings are summarized in Table 3.  Overall, the region’s manufacturing firms expected 
to employ around 780 thousand workers if times were “good” and about 500 thousand if 
times were “bad.”   The former represented an increase of about 40 percent from the 
actual 1939 level of employment, but a reduction by one-half from the 1943 peak.  The 
latter figure was below even the pre-war level.  Manufacturers in Oregon and Washington 
appeared more optimistic than those in California.  The most notable sign of this 
difference was that the manufacturers outside of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries in 
the Pacific Northwest expected that under “good conditions” they would hire more 
workers than they did in 1943 whereas those in California expected their employment to 
decline.  
The California State Reconstruction and Re-employment Commission painted an 
even more pessimistic picture of the state’s post-war prospects.  It estimated the civilian 
labor force in “194X” would be between 3,600 and 4,000 thousand workers.  With “the 
smoothest readjustment and the highest possible levels of business activity,” there would 
be 3,200 thousand civilian jobs within a year of demobilization, but with moderately 
adverse conditions, only 2,800 thousand jobs.  In any case, employment would be below 
the 1943 peak of 3,500 thousand jobs and it would take three or four years of normal 
growth to recover to this level.  According to a Commission report published in late 
1944, unemployment in “194X” California would range between 365 and 1,200 
thousand, with the most likely prospect between 450 and 800 thousand workers.26  
As the war progressed, responsible authorities in the state became still more 
pessimistic about the extent of unemployment.  In 1945, Samuel May, Director of the 
Bureau of Public Administration at the University of California, estimated that total 
unemployment in California at the end of the first year of demobilization (assumed in his 
                                                           
25 “Postwar Intentions of Pacific Coast Manufacturers,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Monthly 
Review (Feb. 1945): 17-20.  As the Fed economists noted the survey covered only existing firms and, 
therefore, missed any increase in activity planned by potential new entrants. 
26 California Reconstruction and Re-employment Commission, How Many Jobs for Californians? (Dec. 
1944): 12-15. 13 
study to be 1946-47) would range between 905 and 1,085 thousand, levels he found 
“startling.”  The main reason for the difference from the State Reconstruction and 
Reemployment Commission figures was that 200 to 350 thousand veterans from other 
states were now expected to move to California after the war.  May anticipated that the 
state’s labor force would be higher than in 1943 by 670 thousand workers and 
employment lower by 315 to 490 thousand.  Overall, California employment would be in 
the range of 2,955 to 3,130 thousand workers, implying about one-quarter of the labor 
force would unemployed.27 
 
 
The Post-War Experience 
 
What actually happened after the war? How did the experts’ predictions measure 
up?  As revealed in the data in Table 2 above, the region’s readjustment proved far easier 
than most of the responsible authorities predicted.  Contemporary observers were stuck 
by two phenomena: (1) overall employment recovered so rapidly–as a writer at the 
Federal Reserve Bank put it in mid-1946 the region experienced a loss of 45 percent of its 
manufacturing jobs “without collapsing or, indeed, showing any signs of distress”; and 
(2) the employment structure at a broad (1-digit SIC) level almost immediately returned 
to its pre-war composition—repeating a common refrain, a 1948 Federal Reserve article 
noted: “the distribution of workers among major industry groups is now not markedly 
different than before the war.  Little trace remains of the wartime pattern of 
employment.”28 
As many contemporaries noted, the adjustment process began before the conflict 
ended with employment in the “war industries” falling gradually from 1943-44 on.   
                                                           
27 A second, later set of estimates by May’s organization put the expected number of jobless Californians 
in mid-1946 in a range between 826 to 1256 thousand workers. These estimates were made independently 
by an industrial engineer, Alfred Norris, as a check on May’s figures.  The differences from the estimates 
of May and the State Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission were chiefly due to greater estimated 
flows of returning veterans, which resulted in higher labor force numbers (4004-4157 thousand) than the 
earlier studies.   US Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Study and Survey Problems of 
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nd Sess., Part 86 California Looks to Its Economic Future: II, Field 
Hearings  Fresno, Calif., Feb. 25, 1946 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1946): 9828.  
28 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Monthly Review (April-May 1946): 19; (Nov. 1948): 105-06. 14 
Nonetheless, the cutbacks after VJ-day hit the West Coast hard.  In the four week period 
after 15 August 1945, more than 300 thousand workers lost their jobs.  Most of the 
decline resulted from the termination of about 100 thousand shipyard workers (out of 385 
thousand employed) and 75 thousand aircraft worker (out of an initial employment of 185 
thousand).   Over the next six weeks, another 100 thousand workers were laid off, again 
mostly in the high-paying “war industries.”  By the end of 1945, total employment in the 
region’s aircraft and shipbuilding industries fell to about 280 thousand, down from 750 
thousand at the start on the year.29  
Unemployment started to climb.  By February 1946, the jobless rate in California 
entered double-digits for the first time since 1941 (See Figure 1).  But the situation 
quickly improved.  Both the number of unemployed persons (485 thousand) and the 
jobless rate (11.6 percent) peaked in April 1946.  By summer, the state’s unemployment 
rate again dropped into single-digit levels and remained in the 5-8 percent range until the 
1949-50 recession.  I have found comparable monthly figures for unemployment rates in 
Oregon over the immediate post-war period (which are included in Figure 1) but 
unfortunately none for Washington state.30  The available information suggests that the 
unemployment rate in the Pacific Northwest was slightly higher than in California in the 
last years of the war and was typically slightly lower in the late 1940s.  Estimates of 
unemployment in the three Pacific Coast states from the US Employment Service 
indicate that the number of unemployed in the region peaked at 725 thousand in March 
1946 and fell to about 600 thousand by May.  The latter approximately matched the pre-
war (April 1940) level when the labor force was about one-third smaller.  Obviously 
unemployment in the conversion period was substantially higher than the wartime low of 
around 100 thousand (in 1943-44) and the region’s unemployment rate remained several 
percentage points higher than the national average.  But joblessness in the post-war 
period was far below expectations and never threatened to bankrupt the region’s 
unemployment compensation systems as had been feared.31 
                                                           
29 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Monthly Review (Aug.-Sept. 1945) : 62-63; (Oct.-Nov. 1945): 
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One reason that unemployment was not higher was that the inflow of out-of-state 
veterans to the West proved to be smaller than most of the wartime studies had predicted.  
In 1947, the Current Population Survey estimated that about 1,301 thousand WWII-era 
veterans lived in the Pacific region, only about 80 thousand more than resided there prior 
to entry into active service.32  The region continued to receive a positive, albeit smaller, 
inflow of migrants.  Between July 1, 1945 and July 1, 1947, the civilian population of the 
Pacific Coast increased from 11,700 thousand to 13,551 thousand.  Of this increase, 
migration accounted for about 342 thousand.  The post-war surge in family formation 
caused the rates of natural increase in the Far West to reach unprecedented levels.   The 
surplus of births over deaths accounts for over four-fifths of the region’s population 
growth.  
Overall, non-agricultural employment in the three Pacific Coast states fell by 290 
thousand workers, or about 7 percent, between 1944 and 1946.  But the 1946 level was 
still 50 percent above the 1940 level.  Most of the decline appears to be due to the 
voluntary withdrawal of the “extra workers”—housewives, students, and retirees—from 
the labor market.  The decline, moreover, was only temporary.  By 1950, non-agricultural 
employment in the region surpassed even the wartime peak. 
How could the Pacific Coast’s economy sustain its greatly enlarged labor force 
and population after the war?  It is useful to frame the issue in a simple demand and 
supply model of the labor market.  During the Second World War, the Pacific Coast 
experienced a dramatic shift out in labor demand in its “war industries”, which led to the 
expansion of its labor force.  After 1943, the military demands began to diminish, but 
employment did not fall as much as predicted.  Why did the wartime reallocation of 
aggregate income and employment “stick”?  There are several possible explanations and I 
would not like to fall into the trap of insisting that only one is valid.33    
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States, April 1, 1947 Current Population Survey, P25, No.5. Note that given the large migration flows of 
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33 Neither 1939-40 nor 1943-44 were periods sustaining long-run full-employment equilibrium in the labor 
market. The 1939 economy was arguably operating at far less than full capacity due to deficient aggregate 
demand.  Perhaps the best indication of the accuracy of this characterization is how rapidly output 
increased and unemployment fell once the wartime demand kicked in.  Another interesting sign about the 
state of the pre-war labor markets is how they responded to the increases in military demands, which were 16 
One possible explanation is that the wartime stimulus did not really end.  The 
emergence and growth of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War period is a 
familiar theme in the economic history of the recent past.  It is well understood that over 
the second half of the twentieth century, military procurement became geographically 
concentrated in the so-called “Gun-Belt” along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coasts.34  
That said, it is important to note that military spending declined sharply after World War 
II as Figure 2 displays.  By 1945, real expenditures for defense expenditures reached the 
unprecedented and, indeed, probably unsustainable sum of $139 billion (in 1958 dollars).  
Between 1945 and 1948, US military spending contracted by $127.6 billion or 92 
percent.  (By way of contrast, the post-Cold War defense contraction from 1989 to 1996 
was only 29 percent; even in absolute terms, the recent drop of $20.9 billion was dwarfed 
by the 1945-48 decline.)  While data on the regional allocation of defense spending for 
the 1946-50 period are not readily available, it is absolutely certain than spending in the 
Pacific region was far lower than at the wartime peak. 
A reading of the West Coast business press in the immediate post-war period 
reveals that virtually no one considered military spending a suitable permanent 
foundation for the region’s economy.  While there were expressions of concern that the 
post-war contraction was too rapid, most business writers placed their faith in the private 
sector.  To the extent that the local business community demanded government 
intervention, it was to combat freight rate discrimination, to help establish western basing 
points for steel prices, and to sell off war surplus facilities in an orderly manner.  Nothing 
in the experience of West's business leaders suggested that the region’s long-term 
economic growth could be based on military sales and few realized that defense demand 
would remain permanently higher until the beginning of the Korean conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
primarily for durable manufactured goods.  The so-called war industries typically saw large increases in 
employment but smaller relative increases in wages than the so-called non-war industries.  The existence of 
a pool of underemployed labor (particularly in the rural areas on the West Central region) during the pre-
war period also helps explain the high degree of responsiveness of migrants to the job opportunities 
opening on the Pacific Coast during the war.  The 1943-44 peak was not the ideal candidate for a period of 
long-run equilibrium either.  By this point, the War Labor Board imposed restrictions on how high wages 
could be increased.  Even earlier, plant allocation decisions and materials controls led to the contraction of 
activity in many activities. 
34 As late as 1996, the Pacific region received 21.6 percent of the DOD Contract Awards and 21.6 percent 
of military payrolls, which was disproportionately larger than its share on national economic activity. 17 
      Between 1945 and 1947, the region’s aircraft industry suffered a severe 
contraction but soon activity stabilized at a level far above pre-war production.  By 1948, 
the Pacific Coast industry was already in the black, owing to a resumption of military 
orders and successful reconversion of a part of the industry to civilian production.  One 
important trend accompanying the post-war contraction of the aircraft industry was its re-
concentration on the West Coast.  A glimpse of this process is offered in Table 4, which 
shows the floor-space of airframe place in 1940, 1944, and 1948.  Before Pearl Harbor 
roughly one-half of the floor-space was on the West Coast.  During the War, the military 
authorities induced the leading West Coast firms to build and operate large plants in the 
mid-continent region.  Although the share of national aircraft floor-space (and 
production) located on the West Coast fell to about one-quarter, the share “managed” by 
West Coast firms remained roughly constant.  After the war, the West Coast firms shut 
down almost all of their mid-continent branch plants and the West Coast share climbed 
back to about one-half of the national total.  
By way of contrast to the aircraft industry, Pacific Coast shipbuilding virtually 
collapsed after VJ day (see Figure 3).  By early 1947, the region’s private and navy yards 
split evenly the sector’s labor force of 65 thousand workers.  For several years after mid-
1947, industry received no orders for new ships and performed only repair work.  By 
early 1950, employment had fallen to about 32 thousand.  Although the industry 
recovered slightly during the Korean conflict, Pacific Coast shipyard activity never again 
approached one-tenth of the 1943-44 levels.35 In summary, military demand in the 
immediate post-war period, while higher than before the war, was far below the wartime 
peak. 
A second alternative explanation for the continued high employment level is that 
migration is costly.  Once people had made the investment to move west in response to 
the wartime boom, they would not automatically move back home when the boom ended.   
The elasticity of labor supply in response to the expansion of demand was higher than 
that in response to the contraction, implying the temporary boom had a ratchet effect on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997, Table No. 550. Also see Ann Markusen, et al., The Rise of 
the Gunbelt: the Military Remapping of Industrial America ( New York : Oxford University Press, 1991). 
35 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Monthly Review (Feb. 1949): 20; US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Employment and Payrolls (various months) and Monthly Labor Review (May 1944) pp. 951-52. 18 
the region’s labor force.  This argument has some plausibility.  But in combination with a 
decline in labor demand in the “war industries,” it implies that relative wages would have 
to fall dramatically to sustain employment.  The available evidence suggests regional 
wages did decline, but the movements were surprisingly mild.  In California, for 
example, the hourly manufacturing wage fell from 120.7 of the national average in the 
1943-45 period to 114.0 in the 1947-49 period.  The latter figure was 0.8 percentage 
points below the ratio prevailing in the 1939-41 period. Given the conventional estimates 
of own-price elasticity of demand for labor (say –0.75), this change would account for 
only a trivial fraction of the relative increase in the state’s employment, holding the labor 
demand constant.36  
The complete explanation must then include an increase in relative labor demand 
from a source other than the military.  It could be due to an increase in demand for the 
region’s exports, which included principally agricultural and wood products and 
nonferrous metals.  But between 1943 and 1946, aggregate employment in these activities 
actually declined in both California and the Pacific Northwest.  
The second and more promising candidate for an expansion of demand was the 
region’s home market.  The wartime boom had increased the real income on the Pacific 
Coast by almost 77 percent between 1940 and 1945. The region’s share of national 
income rose from 9.7 percent to 11.9 percent and its share of national population rose 
from 7.4 percent to 8.9 percent.37  But the wartime controls and labor market conditions 
slowed economic adjustments to meet the enlarged civilian demands. 
The robust growth of the national economy in the immediate post-war period is 
commonly attributed to pent-up demand, to the combination of large levels of private 
savings built up during the war and of small existing stocks of consumer durables and 
housing following a decade-and-a-half of limited purchases.  By most measures, pent-up 
demand on the West Coast was especially intense.  During the early 1940s, the region’s 
per capita income became the highest in the nation, contributing to the rapid 
accumulation of liquid assets.  For example, per capita sales of war bonds on the Pacific 
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Coast were consistently 25-30 percent higher than the national average.  Between 1941 
and 1945, the region’s residents purchased over $4.5 billion Series E Savings Bonds, 
accounting for about 11.6 percent of national sales.  Other forms of liquid savings also 
rose dramatically over the war.  Between the end of 1939 and the end of 1945, bank 
deposits on the Pacific Coast rose from $5.2 billion (7.6 percent of the national total) to 
$17.0 billion (10.3 percent).38  When this spending power was released, a tremendous 
boom resulted.39 
Despite the huge flows of migrants, civilian construction virtually stopped on the 
West Coast in the war years.  By 1943-44, acute housing shortages appeared in most of 
the leading urban centers.  Indeed, as authorities noted, the question of where the 
enlarged population would find homes in the post-war West was second only to the 
question of where they would find jobs.  When construction controls were lifted after 
mid-1945, the region enjoyed an extremely vigorous residential construction boom. Table 
5 displays the real value of authorized construction in urban areas on the Pacific Coast 
from 1943 to 1950.  As it shows, real construction spending in 1947-48 as roughly three 
times the 1943-44 level.  And as Table 2 reveals, over the 1944-48 period, the building 
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Indicators, 1939-46, Economics Series. No. 67 (Washington, DC: GPO 1948): 36-38. 
39 The recent work of Robert Higgs serves as a useful corrective to the view that the consumption boom 
was literally based on dissaving, on spending down savings accumulated during the war.  See Robert 
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Overall, Higgs has a negative assessment of the war’s effects on economic activity. See Robert 
Higgs, “Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940s,” Journal of Economic 
History 52(1), (March 1992): 41-60.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the validity of this 
perspective at the national level, but I will note the underlying conception framework appears to exclude 
scale effects highlighted in the new literatures on economic growth and geography.  Such scale effects 
create the possibility that the wartime stimulus push a regional economy to a new equilibrium. 20 
sector added 92 thousand employees in the Pacific region as a whole, almost all in 
California.  
Even larger and more immediate changes occurred in the trade and service 
sectors.  These activities had not kept pace with the expansion during the war.  Indeed, 
many small retail and wholesale establishments closed because of materials and labor 
shortages.  For example, in California the number of retail stores licensed by the state (to 
collect sales taxes) declined from 250 thousand in 1940 to under 174 thousand in 1943.  
After the war peak, the number bounced back, increasing to 251 thousand in 1946 to 278 
thousand in 1948.40  In Washington State, it was reported that 1500 trade establishments 
per month were started in the late 1945 and early 1946.  Again referring to Table 2, the 
West Coast trade sector added nearly 238 thousand jobs between 1944 and 1948 and the 
service sector (including Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) nearly 138 thousand.  The 
bulk of these increases occurred in California where employment in the trade expanded 
by 177 thousand and that in services by 108 thousand.41 
Finally although employment in the manufacturing sector fell sharply in 1945-46, 
almost all of the contraction was in shipbuilding and aircraft.  Many of the other so-called 
“war industries” such as chemicals, petroleum, rubber tires, and automobiles recovered 
quickly after their initial cutbacks.  And the growth in the “non-war industries” offset the 
decline in the “war industries” to a far greater extent than was expected.  Table 6 presents 
data on the number of production workers on the Pacific Coast by major industry group 
for 1939, 1947, and 1950.  As it shows, even excluding aircraft and shipbuilding, 
manufacturing employment on the West Coast increased by almost 70 percent between 
1939 and 1947.  The industrial groups typically associated with larger scale (SIC 28-30, 
33-38) generally experienced faster growth. 
Most contemporaries placed special emphasis on the growth of large-scale basic 
industries.  Indeed, the establishment of the West’s first modern integrated steel plants at 
Fontana, CA and Geneva, UT were widely considered the region’s major “war 
winnings.”  But it is important to observe how broadly based the expansion was.  Jane 
Jacobs’ classic analysis of the “import replacement” process in post-war Los Angeles 
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highlights the vital role that the diverse array of small and medium-size startup firms 
played in the region’s reconversion:   
.…new enterprises started in corners of old loft buildings, in Quonset huts and in 
backyard garages.  But they multiplied swiftly, mostly by the breakaway method.  And 
many grew swiftly.  They poured forth furnaces, sliding doors, mechanical saws, shoes, 
bathing suits, underwear, china, furniture, cameras, hand tools, hospital equipment, 
scientific instruments, engineering services and hundred of other things.  One-eighth of 
all the new business started in the United States during the latter half of the 1940s were 
started in Los Angeles.42 
 
My examination of the federal government figures suggests the latter statistic is 
somewhat exaggerated.  Nonetheless, the surge in business formation on the Pacific 
Coast during the immediate post-WWII period was highly impressive, as the evidence in 
Tables 7 and 8 reveal.  Table 7 presents statistics, constructed by the US Office of 
Business Economics based on the payroll tax records of the Bureau of Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance, on the population and composition on business firms in operation.  
Table 8 adds information on the number and rates of new entries, exits, and transfers over 
the 1945-50 period for the Pacific Coast, California, and the United States as a whole.  
The data on the aggregate number of firms show that the business population on the 
Pacific Coast increased by almost one-half between 1945 and 1950 compared with a rise 
by one-third nationally. The Far West’s expansion was both deep and wide; in every 
sector, the proportional increase was greater on the Pacific Coast than in the nation as a 
whole.  The growth of the number of western firms was most rapid in contract 
construction (2.56 times), followed by wholesale trade (1.67), manufacturing (1.46) and 
retail trade (1.44), service (1.36), and all other industries (1.19).  Indeed, the Office of 
Business Economics study indicates that the rate of new business entry in the West 
outpaced that in every other region of the country.   And while it appears that Jacobs’ 
statement that Los Angeles accounted for one-eighth of the nation’s startups is off, the 
Pacific Coast as a whole exceeded this share.  Most of these new firms obviously started 
small, and many “failed.”  (Rates of exits and business transfers on the Pacific Coast 
were also substantially higher than the national averages, and whereas entry rates 
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generally declined over the late 1940s, exit rates rose.)43  Finally, it is important to note 
that, as the recent New Economic Growth literature serves to emphasize, the extent of the 
local market can matter importantly for growth even when firm sizes are small. 
At a conceptual level, we may distinguish three ways--called here “multiplier,” 
“accelerator,” and “threshold” effects--in which local production may depend on the local 
market.  In the first, based on the familiar “multiplier” mechanism of macroeconomics, 
the level of local production increases roughly proportionately with the size of local 
income or population.  This relationship appears to characterize trade, much of the 
service sector, and manufacturing activities such as printing or the processing of 
perishable foods.  In proximate terms, the “multiplier” relationship probably explains 
most of the expansion of the Pacific Coast economy after the war.  But such growth is 
“passive” or “induced” and, from first principles, cannot account for the entire increase or 
explain its fundamental cause. 
  The second effect, based on the accelerator principle, recognizes that for some 
activities the size of local demand depends on the change (rather than the level) of local 
population and income.  The construction sector and building-materials industries fall 
into this category.  The vigorous growth of building activity explains another large part of 
the region’s post-war recovery.  But this mechanism can not alone account for why the 
higher level of economic activity was sustainable.  As the discussion of the investment 
accelerator in any standard macro text points out, the process has self-generating cycles.  
Once growth begins to slow, sectors characterized by an accelerator relationship will 
begin to contract, further slowing the economy.  To explain the appearance of a 
permanently high level of economic activity in the region requires something more.  
The third type of “home market effect”--the “threshold” effect recently 
highlighted in the New Economic Geography literature--is one possibility.  The idea here 
is that production technologies for some goods involve fixed costs or other forms of 
increasing-returns-to-scale that make local production unprofitable if the local market is 
too small.  As the market grows, it becomes economical to establish a larger number of 
plants producing a wider range of goods in the region.  In this case, local production will 
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increase more than one-for-one with an increase in the size of the local market.  Much of 






The third type effect of “home market effect” is especially intriguing in light the 
prediction in the New Economic Geography literature that a region might possess more 
than one equilibrium level of economic activity consistent with the same “fundamentals.”  
Paul Krugman’s work has emphasized that three factors-- increasing returns to scale 
(with the accompanying conditions of imperfect competition), labor mobility, and 
transportation costs -- are key for such “home market effects” to matter significantly.  
The case of manufacturing on the Pacific Coast in the mid-twentieth century matches the 
theoretical requirements well.44 
In addition, accounts of the West's growth written as the region developed--the 
key works here are by Gordon and Niklason--stress the role of “home market effects” in 
the growth process.  Gordon called the inadequate size of the western market “the most 
important factor that has hampered the growth of manufacturing” in the region. Because 
of the small market, western firms could not produce “on a sufficiently large scale” to 
offset the competitive advantages of eastern producing centers.  Niklason's account of the 
long-run growth process is particular apt: 
 
The volume of output necessary to take full advantage of the saving incident to 
large scale production depends upon the product, and the differences between various 
products in this respect are great.  This factor alone precludes the immediate development 
of certain industries common to older, more populous regions...However, as population 
increases and creates larger markets, opportunity is given to establish new industries until 
eventually industrial maturity is attained.... 
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These accounts also recognized the reverse flow from local production to local market 
size, which made the process self-reinforcing.  Indeed, a reading of the region's business 
press yields the impression that the process was self-generating.  In particular, many 
writers in the 1940s argued the temporary boom during World War II set “the West on its 
Way.”45   
Did the World War II shock shift the Pacific Coast economy from a “low-level” 
equilibrium to a “high-level” equilibrium?  Were the “home market effects” that strong?  
To address these questions, this section explores in greater detail the long-run 
relationship between income and the value of manufacturing production.   As part of 
larger project on the economic development of the region, I have constructed a new panel 
data set on manufacturing activity in the United States and California for the period since 
1849.  Comprehensive data on four-digit industries were drawn from the Census of 
Manufacturing and assembled into consistent time series. (A list of the variables used in 
the analysis is provided in Table 9.  Their summary statistics are reported in Table 10.)  
Unfortunately the data refer only to California and not the Pacific Coast as a whole.  
Given the state’s great importance in the region and its dominant role in the expansion 
during World War II, examining the California experience in detail promises to shed 
considerable light on the development process of the region more generally.   
To assess the role of “home market effects,” I predict the level of real 
manufacturing value added in California using the level (or national share) of personal 
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income earned in the state as a measure of the size of the home market.46  This analysis 
adopts the following conceptual approach: California real manufacturing value added is 
modeled as proportional to national real manufacturing value added,  
 
CalRVAit =α itUSRVAit. 
 
where the proportion, α it, depends on relative demand, δ (Dit),  and supply, σ (Sit).  D 
represents the set of demand shifters, S represents supply shifters.  That is, 
 
CalRVAit =δ (Dit)σ (Sit)USRVAit. 
 
Relative supply is modeled as a function of establishment scale, human capital 
requirements, relative wages over time, freight rates over time, and the industry’s two-
digit category.  Relative demand is modeled as a function of the California income 
relative to national income (call θ t=CalYt/USYt) and, in some formulations, whether the 
industry exports. 
A sample formulation would have θ t raised to a power η  as in: 
CalRVAit =δ (θ t) σ (Zit) USRVAit=θ t
η   σ (Zit) USRVAit    (or in logs) 
 
log(CalRVAit)= η  log (θ t
 )+log
  σ (Zit) + log(USRVAit) 
 
In the models run, the coefficient on log(USRVAit) is not constrained to equal unity, 
reflecting the possibility that USRVA enters in the supply shifters as well. 
Following in the spirit of the Davis/Weinstein interpretation of Krugman’s work, 
the test of the “home market effect” hypothesis has two forms: 
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η >0    “home markets” matter at least weakly, (for example, transport costs>0). 
η >1  “home markets effects” lead to a greater than one-for-one increase in 
production in line with the New Economic Geography models.47 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the Tobit regressions run on the pooled cross-
section/time series over the 1879-1963 period.  Equation 1 predicts the (log of) real value 
added of each industry in California based on the (log of) industry’s national real value 
added, establishment scale, and wages per wage earner, and time-series variables 
reflecting the general relative wage in California, an index of real regional freight rate, 
and California personal income and national personal income.48  A set of consistent and 
largely sensible results emerges from the analysis.  Industries with large establishment 
sizes nationally (as captured by lusrvest) had lower levels of output in the state, 
confirming the impression that the region’s limited market constrained industrial activity 
in sectors characterized by increasing-returns-to-scale.  Industries with hihg human 
capital intensity (reflected in lusrwgwe) were more common in the state.   
Among the time series variables,  the relative wage variable has a significant 
negative effect whereas the freight rates variable proved insignificant.  The coefficient on 
California income has a large positive effect, but that on national income has a large(r) 
negative effect, which is troubling.  Is this due to strong backwash effects?  It seems more 
likely to be the result of the substantial colinearity that exists between state and national 
incomes.  In line with the conceptual approach outlined above, the model may be run 
using income shares. The standard likelihood ratio test approves of this formulation (but 
it is interesting that the use of manufacturing output shares, that is, constraining the 
coefficient of lusrva to be unity, is rejected.)   
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Regional Production Structure: An Empirical Investigation,” European Economic Review, 43:2, (Feb. 
1999): 379-407. 
48 One potential difficulty that must give pause is the endogeneity of industrial production and the size of 
the home market/ regional income.  Indeed, the feedback from production to the market size is at the heart 
of the cumulative causation story.  Here is where the micro-data help (in addition, to providing standard 
errors on the magnitude of the effects and a far number of degrees of freedom to test alternative 
explanations.)  The typical 4-digit industry was very small compared with the total size of the California 
economy.  For example, in 1939, the value added of the median California industry was $577,099, a little 
over one-tenth of one percent of the total personal income of $5.3 billion. 27 
Equation 2 reports the results of the income share regression.  The coefficient of 
California’s income share (as reflected by lcalusy) becomes about 1.44, which implies 
that a ten-percent increase in the size of the region’s market increases its industrial output 
by about 14 percent.   This seems large, but it is not wholly implausible given that the 
elasticity of national manufacturing output with respect to income was about 1.27 in the 
sample.  What remains implausible is that the effect is constant over all market sizes.  
Equation 3 addresses this problem by adding (orthogonalized) higher order terms in the 
market size variable.  Likelihood ratio tests approve of including terms up to the third 
order.  These results suggest an S-shaped and somewhat more damped “home market 
effect.”  The exact impact of a given change in the market size depends on what the 
income share is.    
A key problem in the interpretation in these regressions is the issue of omitted 
variable biases. To control for the possibility that short-run supply shocks (strikes, 
earthquakes) might be attributed to the California market share, I have included 
individual year dummies in the model successively.  In no case were the effects 
statistically significant or the basic results altered.  Inclusion of a time trend also proved 
inconsequential.  A further possible problem is that the results may reflect business cycle 
effects.  To control for this effect, I included a measure of the US output gap, specifically 
the deviation of real GDP from its long-run average.  The business cycle coefficient 
proved statistically insignificant and again the basic pattern of results was not changed. 
There remains the possibility that the measured “home market effects” are picking 
up omitted long-run supply shifts.  Indeed, the New Economic Geography literature has 
its own supply-side candidate—labor-market-pooling effects which can also lead to a 
positive feedback relationship.  One way to begin to address this issue is to examine a 
model in which the export and non-export industries are treated separately.  The “home 
market” and “plant scale” effects are presumably less important for the export industries.  
If the “home market” effect remains strong, it lends support to the argument that the 
model is really capturing supply-side instead of demand-side forces.  28 
Equation 4 runs the regression with separate coefficients for the leading export 
activities, defined to comprise canning, petroleum refining, shipbuilding, and aircraft.49  
The regression includes a new set of variables created by multiplying the existing 
variables times an one/zero dummy reflecting whether or not the industry falls in the 
export category.  Essentially, these industries are allowed separate slope terms.  While the 
estimates are not highly precise, the separate slope terms wipe out most of the 
establishment size and “home market” effects for the export industries.  An increase in 
the region’s market size by one percent (using 1939 as a base) reduces output in the 
export industries by 0.6 percent.  The absence of a “home market effect” for exports 
paradoxically supports the “home market” hypothesis overall-- it’s not working where it 
shouldn’t.50 
What do these results imply about the possibility of multiple equilibria and the 
impact of World War II spending?  To explore these issues, consider a toy model of the 
California economy.  Let it be made up of three parts: a resource-base or export sector 
that produces a given output, B, independent of the size of the home market; a service 
sector where production grows proportionately with the home market, S=sY, and the 
manufacturing sector characterized by the non-linear production-income relationship 
estimated above, M(Y).  Ignoring the distinction between income and output, aggregate 
income will equal: 
 
(1) Y=B+sY+ M(Y)=(B+M(Y))/(1-s).   
 
Obviously, there may be multiple equilibria in Y supported by the same base, B, if the 
non-linear equation (*) has more than one root.  This will depend on the strength of the 
non-linear production-income relationship embodied in M(Y) relative to the size of B.  
Even if there are multiple equilibria, they may not be very different if the roots are close. 
                                                           
49 Inter-regional trade data are scanty but the available information indicates that canning and petroleum 
accounted for the vast majority of California manufacturing exports.  Including aircraft and shipbuilding, 
these industries account for about 19.5 of California manufacturing value added in 1939.  
50 The cubic series is quite well behaved within the sample, but it would be problematic to extrapolate it 
far out of sample because no bounds have been imposed.  The underlying series on the market/income 
share is quite flat until the 1900s and then “takes off’; the stabilization of the income share begins in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, at the end of the period under consideration. 29 
Let us use this model to analyze the state of the California economy on the eve of 
World War Two.  To be concrete, assume the primary sector (farming, agricultural 
services, and mining) is the base.  Over the 1938-40 period, this sector made up 10.5 
percent of earnings in California whereas manufacturing accounted for 16.1 percent of 
the state’s earnings.  We will treat the remaining 73.4 percent of earnings as the service 
sector.51  
From the regression analysis, we know that holding all other variables (including 
national income) constant, the M(Y) relationship in 1939 has roughly the following form 
in the cubic specification: 
 
Percentage Increase in California: 
 
Income      5  10  15    20  25  30 
Manufacturing  Value  Added    9.4  17.0 22.8 26.8 29.0 29.4 
 
A data point of special interest what would happen if income increased by 21 
percent--the percentage change in California’s income share over the 1939-47 period.  
The regression equations indicate that a 21 percent increase in the California home 
market would have resulted in a 27.3 percent increase in manufacturing value added 
under the cubic specification.  In the model sketched above, would such increases in 
income have created a sufficiently large market  (in the absence in a change in the base) 
to support itself?  Simple calculations suggest not; the effects are powerful, but not quite 
strong enough.  An increase in manufacturing value added of 27.3 percent combined with 
no change in the base would have increased California income by only about 16.6 percent 
(=(0.105+1.273*0.161)/0.266)-1).  
But the results suggest that an increase in 1939 income by 11 percent would have 
been self-sustaining.  An 11 percent increase would have increased manufacturing output 
by 18.5 percent, which in turn would have been sufficient to support the initial increase in 
income.  This implies that roughly one-half of the increase in the region’s income share 
                                                           
51 If the definition of the base is enlarged to include federal government earnings (the extractive sector 
plus), the share of total income becomes 15.7 percent in 1939.  The service share becomes 68.2 percent.  30 
over the war might be due to a transition between “low-level” and “high-level” equilibria.  
Even if the “home market effects” have been overestimated here, the slope of the output-
income relationship shown in equation (1) appears quite steep in the relevant range.  This 
implies a small change in the base, for example due to the shift in military spending from 
its low pre-war values to its somewhat higher post-war values, could have had a large 
effect on the level of aggregate activity.  Obviously this is just a toy model, but these 
results offer surprisingly strong support for the rather speculative predictions of the new 





  This paper argues that the experience of the Pacific Coast economy after World 
War II is consistent with the existence of strong “home market effects.”  The econometric 
analysis of the long-run relationship between local income and manufacturing production 
suggests that these effects were not constant across all market sizes.  Rather, they first 
increased and then diminished in strength.  This has two interesting historical 
implications. 
  First, the “home market effects” appear strongest not in the immediate post-war 
period, but in the inter-war years.  During the 1920s, the Pacific Coast, and especially 
California, enjoyed a period of vigorous economic growth, which was cut short by the 
Great Depression.  Many aspects of the region’s post-war experience—its population 
growth, the establishment of branch plants by national manufacturing firms, the building 
boom, and the expansion of the service sector—were also present in the 1920s.  It 
remains an open question whether World War II shocked the Pacific Coast to a level of 
economic activity that was otherwise unattainable or merely sped the transition to the 
inevitable long-run equilibrium.  I would argue that the continuity vs. discontinuity 
debate over the impact of World War II in the West should shift to consider this broader 
issue, which requires giving greater attention to the region’s secular development and less 
to the “four short years” of the war. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Making this change would tend to reduce further the possibility of multiple equilibria.  31 
Second, the “home market effects” became far weaker as the region matured.  If 
regional leaders used the late-1940s experience as a guide and downplayed the risk of 
becoming dependence on military spending in the Cold War period, they were drawing a 
mistaken historical lesson.   When the cutbacks came in the early-1990s, the region’s 
economy appears to have suffered much more than after the larger declines of military 
spending in the 1945-48 period.  There was no great “unfilled” home market waiting in 
the wings to absorb the displaced aerospace workers and to propel continued growth.  
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TABLE 1: Military Spending in the Pacific Region, 1940-45.        
                
   California Oregon  Washington  Pacific    Percentage 
               Coast      of Nation   
              
Total in Billion Dollars 19.7  2.1 5.2  27.0    11.8  
                
Total Supply Contracts 17.1  1.8 4.6  23.5   12.0  
 Aircraft  9.3  0.0 2.0  11.2    19.0  
 Ships  5.2  1.6 2.1  8.9    29.8  
 Ordnance  0.6  0.0 0.1  0.7    1.5  
 Comm.  Eqmt  0.1  0.0 0.0  0.1    1.2  
 Others  2.0  0.2 0.4  2.6    5.4  
                
                
Total Facilities 2.5  0.3 0.7  3.5    10.9  
 Industrial  1.0  0.1 0.3  1.5    8.0  
 Military  1.5  0.2 0.3  2.0    14.7  
                
1939 Mfg Wage-Earners             
Total in Thousands       271.3        57.3            82.3       411.0     5.3  
  Aircraft         16.0            -                3.4         19.4     39.9  
  Shipbuilding           4.0           0.2             1.6           5.8    8.4  
                
1940 Population   6,907  1,090 1,736  9,733   6.5  
In Thousands               
                
Facillities through May 1945, Supply Contracts through June 1945       
                
Source:                  
US Department of Commerce, Office of Domestic Commerce, State and Regional Market  
Indicators, 1939-45, Economics Series. No. 60 (Washington, DC: GPO 1947), pp. 28-29.   
 37 
 
TABLE 2: Pacific Coast Civilian Employment (in Thousands) by Major Sector, 1939-
50.       
                  
 Total  Mining  Contract  Manufacturing    Transport &  Trade  FIRE  Service  Government
        Construction    Pub. Utilities          
PACIFIC                  
1939 2501.6  45.6  106.2  588.4  271.3  660.0 121.7  344.4 364.0 
1940 2670.2  46.7  124.1  658.9  282.9  688.9 127.4  354.0 387.3 
1941 3117.8  46.7  184.8  860.8  314.7  750.1 134.0  377.5 449.2 
1942 3722.8  39.7  219.3 1261.4  335.7  770.0 128.4  412.1 556.2 
1943 4239.1  34.6  201.2 1648.3  354.7  777.7 125.2  439.2 658.2 
1944 4305.1  34.3  204.0 1581.5  378.0  805.0 125.3  463.0 714.0 
1945 4052.1  34.4  175.3 1249.3  390.1  853.6 130.6  476.8 742.0 
1946 4014.8  37.8  223.3 1001.8  408.4  965.9 158.7  529.0 689.9 
1947 4170.4  38.8  265.7 1034.9  428.7  1023.0 170.2  546.4 662.7 
1948 4281.5  40.4  301.6 1053.1  432.9  1042.9 179.1  547.5 684.0 
1949 4178.2  38.9  263.6 1003.2  416.5  1014.1 180.7  542.8 718.4 
1950 4331.1  36.6  295.1 1076.3  419.8  1032.9 194.1  545.5 730.8 
                  
Share of Growth                 
1940-44 1.00  -0.01  0.05  0.56  0.06  0.07  0.00  0.07  0.20 
1944-50 1.00  0.09  3.50  -19.43  1.61  8.77  2.65  3.17  0.65 
1940-50 1.00  -0.01  0.10  0.25  0.08  0.21  0.04  0.12  0.21 
                  
CALIFORNIA                
1939 1812.0  40.0  76.4  384.4  185.1  504.7  96.4  274.7 250.3 
1940 1931.8  40.0  89.5  440.2  190.3  524.2 100.9  280.4 266.3 
1941 2264.9  40.1  135.1  593.6  213.0  572.1 105.8  297.4 307.8 
1942 2689.7  33.8  152.3  876.0  233.8  588.0 100.4  321.3 384.1 
1943 3083.5  29.4  137.9 1165.5  250.8  596.1  97.3  341.5 465.0 
1944 3116.5  29.9  133.1 1109.7  268.0  614.0  96.0  355.2 510.6 
1945 2960.8  30.6  136.1  860.8  279.5  654.2 100.2  365.7 533.7 
1946 2972.6  33.5  172.3  706.7  295.5  737.1 122.3  405.0 500.2 
1947 3079.9  34.2  202.4  721.8  312.6  774.7 132.3  418.9 483.0 
1948 3162.9  35.6  225.2  734.2  317.9  790.6 139.8  418.7 500.9 
1949 3088.0  34.4  197.7  701.5  306.0  767.2 141.0  415.6 524.6 
1950 3209.5  32.3  225.3  759.7  307.1  783.2 151.8  416.8 533.3 
                  
Share of Growth                 
1940-44 1.00  -0.01  0.04  0.57  0.07  0.08  0.00  0.06  0.21 
1944-50 1.00  0.03  0.99  -3.76  0.42  1.82  0.60  0.66  0.24 
1940-50 1.00  -0.01  0.11  0.25  0.09  0.20  0.04  0.11  0.21 
                  
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics website.             38 
TABLE 3:  “Post-war Intentions of Pacific Coast Manufacturers” 
 
Employment in Thousand Workers 
   Actual    Expected  if  Conditions 
   1939 1943   “Good  ”   “Bad” 
Pacific Coast 
All    558.8  1588.9   781.6   500 




All    375.7  1137.1   535.4   350 




All    183.1  451.8   246.2   150 
All  excl.  shipbdg    176.7 210.5   230.0   NA 
and aircraft 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,  




TABLE 4: Geographic Distribution of Aircraft Floorspace 
         
             Total covered floor area in thousand square feet   
         
  Jan. 1940  Jan. 1944  Dec. 1947  Dec. 1948   
Floorspace         
New England  271  2259  1808 1903 
Middle Atlantic  1710  19918  6751 6189 
East North Central  269  17251  1672 3065 
West North Central  671  9561  3410 5842 
South Atlantic  1337  10983  3722 3772 
South Central  40  16619  4106 4003 
Pacific 4479  29533  20904 22200 
United States  8777  106124  42373 46974 
         
Percentage Shares         
New England  3.1  2.1  4.3 4.1 
Middle Atlantic  19.5  18.8  15.9 13.2 
East North Central  3.1  16.3  3.9 6.5 
West North Central  7.6  9.0  8.0 12.4 
South Atlantic  15.2  10.3  8.8 8.0 
South Central  0.5  15.7  9.7 8.5 
Pacific 51.0  27.8  49.3 47.3 
         
Sources: Cunningham, pp. 203-15,US Civilian Aeronautical 
Administration, Statistical Handbook of Civil Aviation,  
 1948, p. 54; 1949, p, 54         
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TABLE 5: Real Value of Urban Construction Expenditures, 1943-50. 
          
In Millions of 1958 Dollars       
          
  All  Urban Building    New Residential  
 Construction    Buildings     
 United  Pacific    United  Pacific 
 States  Coast    States  Coast 
1943 2222.0 535.6    1027.1  287.1 
1944 1892.4 515.6    594.0  197.3 
1945 3294.6 742.5    1110.9  316.1 
1946 7111.5 1431.6    3768.8  779.2 
1947 7457.5 1455.4    3964.3  832.8 
1948 8764.3 1776.6    4529.4  1037.2 
1949 9352.8 1474.7    5120.5  833.5 
1950 13070.3 2030.7    7769.5  1228.9 
          
Sources:            
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Construction, Bull. 916, 984, 1047,1146 
deflated by GNP deflator, Historical Statistics of the US, Series F5, p. 224.  
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TABLE 6: Production Workers in Pacific Coast Manufacturing, 1939-50. 
          
         %  Change 
   1939  1947  1950  1939-47 
20 Food      94,185     130,876     132,725              39.0  
21 Tobacco  na   na  na    na 
22 Textiles       6,822        7,828        6,519              14.7  
23 Apparel      25,831       42,737       52,735              65.4  
24 Lumber      63,506     123,623     156,583              94.7  
25 Furniture      14,097       22,355       20,618              58.6  
26 Paper      16,613       25,787       30,346              55.2  
27 Printing      20,529       30,480       35,892              48.5  
28 Chemicals      10,940       21,255       26,324              94.3  
29 Petroleum       9,601       17,628       14,693              83.6  
30 Rubber  na   na  na    na 
31 Leather       2,848        5,603   na             96.7  
32 Stone/Glass/Clay      13,115       27,765       28,901            111.7  
33 Primary Metals      15,790       36,127       42,318            128.8  
34 Fabricated Metals      22,356       52,677       52,245            135.6  
35 Machinery (Non-Elec.)      15,623       47,294       39,785            202.7  
36 Electrical Eqmt.       4,137       15,667       15,993            278.7  
37 Transportation Eqmt      32,097     107,039     107,965            233.5  
38 Instruments       1,462        5,565        6,714            280.6  
39 Misc. Manufactures       5,540       12,985   na           134.4  
  Total    411,038     745,915     804,465              81.5  
          
372 Aircraft      19,426       66,510   na           242.4  
373 Shipbuilding       5,823       23,727   na           307.5  
  Combined      25,249       90,237   na           257.4  
            
  Transport minus aircraft       6,848       16,802   na           145.4  
 and  shipbuilding           
          
  Total  minus aircraft    385,789     655,678   na             70.0  
 and  shipbuilding         
          
Source: Census of Manufactures, 1947, Vo. III, Statistics by States (1950) pp. 50-51,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 8:  New Business Entries, Exit, and Transfers on the Pacific Coast and United States, 1945-50 
              
Panel A: Number of New Business Entries, Exits, and Transfers (in thousand)   
                  Average 
            1945  1946  1947 1948 1949 1950    Shares   
New  Businesses                   
  Pacific  Coast    64.8  89.3  72.5 57.6 47.1 48.0    14.7% 
  California    46.1  66.4  54.7 43.1 35.8 34.8    10.9% 
  United  States    422.8  617.4  460.8 393.3 331.1 348.2      
                     
Discontinuation                   
  Pacific  Coast    25.5  29.9  41.1 44.1 51.1 41.3    15.5% 
  California    18.2  21.1  31.3 32.7 39.5 30.1    11.5% 
  United  States    175.6  208.7  239.2 282.0 306.5 289.4      
                     
Transferred  businesses                   
  Pacific  Coast    72.5  95.0  92.9 77.5 66.7 63.2    15.5% 
  California    53.0  70.5  69.8 58.0 49.5 44.8    11.4% 
  United  States    473.1  626.9  571.9 501.3 434.8 419.4      
                     
                     
Panel B: Entry, Exit, and Transfer Rates per 100 Firms in Operation on Jan. 1.         
            1945  1946  1947 1948 1949 1950    Average   
New Business Entrance Rates                    
  Pacific  Coast    21.8  26.6  18.3 13.5 10.7 11.0    17.0 
  California    21.0  26.9  18.7 13.6 11.0 10.8    17.0 
  United  States    14.1  19.0  12.6 10.2 8.3 8.7    12.2 
                     
Discontinuation  Rates                   
  Pacific  Coast    8.6  8.9  10.4 10.3 11.6 9.5    9.9 
  California    8.3  8.5  10.7 10.4 12.1 9.3    9.9 
  United  States    5.9  6.4  6.6 7.3 7.7 7.2    6.8 
                     
Transfer  Rates                   
    Far West     24.4  28.3  23.5 18.2 15.2 14.5   20.7 
  California    24.2  28.5  23.9 18.4 15.2 13.9    20.7 
  United  States    15.8  19.3  15.7 12.9 10.9 10.5    14.2 
                     
Source: Betty C. Churchill, "State Distribution of Business Concerns," Survey of Current Business (Nov. 1954) pp. 14-20   
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lcalrva: the log of the value added of manufacturing in California deflated by the national GDP 




  lusrva: the log of the value added of manufacturing in US deflated by the national GDP deflator.   
 
lusrvest: the log of the value added of manufacturing in US deflated by the national GDP deflator 
and divided by the number of establishments nationally. 
 
  lusest: the log of the number of establishments nationally. 
 
lusrwgwe: the log of the census average wage rate of manufacturing in US, as captured by the 
wage bill divided by the number of wage-earners/production worker and then deflated by the 
national GDP deflator. 
 
Sic20-Sic38: zero/one dummy variables for the standard industrial classification categories based 
on the 1947 manual with Sic39, Misc. Manufacturing, as the omitted category. 
 






lrfr:  the log of an index of real freight rates based on the Southern Pacific’s revenues per ton-mile 
deflated by the GDP deflator. 
 
lrelwage: the log of manufacturing wage rates in California relative to the US as a whole as 
captured by the Census average wage. 
  
  lcalry: the log of California personal income deflated by the national GDP deflator. 
 
  lusry: the log of US personal income deflated by the national GDP deflator. 
 
  dcalusy: the difference between lcalry and lusry; orthrogonalized higher order terms also used. 
 
  year, yrX: year effects, year dummies 44 
 
TABLE 10: Data description and summary statistics   
        
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
lcalrva 5174  7.423405  4.020248  0 15.92315 
lusrva 5174  12.35482  1.844457  4.725273 17.88064 
lusrvest 5174  7.194097  1.356098 2.826674 12.92957 
lusrwgwe 5174  2.519553  0.439907  -4.298731 5.156118 
lcalry 5174  15.34731  1.133722  13.27001 17.06468 
lusry 5174  18.10674  0.758972  16.52545 19.28708 
dcalusy 5174  -2.75943  0.384385  -3.345407 -2.2224 
ocalusy2 5174  -0.00091  0.116656  -0.1492343 0.166946 
ocalusy3 5174  0.005191  0.030653  -0.0432281 0.049357 
lrelwage 5174  0.169469  0.083795  0.0769611 0.329304 
lrfr 5174  -4.29459  0.557019  -5.041845 -2.91466 
export 5174  0.020495  0.1417  0 1 
sic20 5174  0.098415  0.297903  0 1 
sic21 5174  0.007927  0.08869  0 1 
sic22 5174  0.079466  0.270491  0 1 
sic23 5174  0.069606  0.254506  0 1 
sic24 5174  0.037316  0.189554  0 1 
sic25 5174  0.022429  0.148087  0 1 
sic26 5174  0.029002  0.167829  0 1 
sic27 5174  0.03519  0.184276  0 1 
sic28 5174  0.092227  0.289375  0 1 
sic29 5174  0.014308  0.118768  0 1 
sic30 5174  0.010248  0.10072  0 1 
sic31 5174  0.031516  0.174724  0 1 
sic32 5174  0.062838  0.242696  0 1 
sic33 5174  0.058005  0.233775  0 1 
sic34 5174  0.07676  0.266235  0 1 
sic35 5174  0.072119  0.25871  0 1 
sic36 5174  0.024362  0.154185  0 1 
sic37 5174  0.031129  0.173684  0 1 
sic38 5174  0.032289  0.176784  0 1 
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TABLE 11: Tobit Regressions of Pooled Cross-Section Time-Series    
              
Dependent  Variable:  Lcalrva           
With  2-Digit  SIC  Dummies          
              
Equation    (1) (2) (3)    (4)     (5) 
                  All  Export    Home Only
              
lusrva coeff.  1.782 1.780 1.783  1.770 -0.552  1.774
 std.  err.  0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 1.061  0.033
              
lusrvest coeff.  -1.256 -1.258 -1.264  -1.298 1.182  -1.299
 std.  err.  0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.319  0.047
              
lusrwgwe coeff.  1.510 1.511 1.503  1.600 -0.552  1.060
 std.  err.  0.175 0.175 0.182 0.184 1.061  0.186
              
lrelwage coeff.  -1.961 -2.313 -0.911  -0.952 1.151  -0.940
 std.  err.  0.828 0.758 0.946 0.945 6.698  0.959
              
lrfr coeff.  -0.357 0.017 -0.820  -0.176 0.279  -0.181
 std.  err.  0.407 0.085 0.213 0.212 0.739  0.216
              
lcalry  coeff. 1.926         
  std.  err.  0.536         
              
lusry  coeff.  -2.414         
  std.  err.  0.536         
              
dcalusy coeff.   1.439 1.378  1.341 -1.131  1.334
 std.  err.    0.276 0.277  0.275 0.963  0.281
              
ocalusy2 coeff.      -0.348 -0.429 -2.373  -0.431
 std.  err.      0.433  0.434 3.080  0.440
              
ocalusy3 coeff.      -4.415 -4.269 3.819  -4.287
 std.  err.      1.652  1.655 11.091  1.678
              
_se coeff. 3.059 3.059 3.057  3.030   3.069
 std.  err.  0.035 0.035 0.035  0.035    0.036
              
Pseudo R2  0.1508 0.1507 0.1510  0.1538    0.1497
              
# Obs    5174 5174 5174  5174    5068
# Left-censored Obs  948 948 948  948    948
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